South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
Volume 5
Issue 2 Spring

Article 3

2009

Maritime Wrongful Death: A Primer Symposium Papers
Rett Guerry

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Guerry, Rett (2009) "Maritime Wrongful Death: A Primer Symposium Papers," South Carolina Journal of
International Law and Business: Vol. 5 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb/vol5/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons.
For more information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH: A PRIMER
Rett Guerry
Maritime wrongful death law is made up of three distinct areas.
The first area is covered by the Jones Act,' which creates a wrongful
death action against a seaman's employer when he is injured or killed
through the negligence of his employer.2 The Jones Act, discussed
below, applies only to vessels of private ownership or operation.3 In
addition to pecuniary damages, pain and suffering damages are
compensable under the Jones Act.4
The second area of maritime wrongful death law is covered by the
Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), which was recently codified
into positive law.5 DOHSA applies to accidents causing death which
occur more than three nautical miles from United States' shores;
however, it does not apply to the Great Lakes or waters within the
territorial waters of a state.6 This provision applies to the site of an
accident on the high seas, not where injury actually occurs or where the
wrongful act causing the accident may have originated.7 Unlike the
Jones Act, which applies only to a seaman's employer, DOHSA applies
to any party whose wrongful act, neglect, or default causes the
decedent's death on the high seas.
By contract, only pecuniary
damages are recoverable under DOHSA.
In addition to Jones Act and DOHSA claims, there also exists the
area of general maritime law wrongful death action. 9 General maritime
law is judicially-created law intended to fill gaps in admiralty not
addressed by legislation. Thus, general maritime law can apply when a
maritime wrongful death occurs within United States' territorial
* Rett Guerry is a former tugboat captain with many years of
experience on the water. Presently, he is an attorney with Motley Rice, LLC in
Mount Pleasant, South Carolina.
46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
2 In re Offshore Transport Servs., L.L.C. 409 F. Supp. 2d 753, 755
(E.D. La.2005).
3 Schwecke v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 225, 228 (D.C. Cal. 1951).
4 See Schwecke, 96 F. Supp. 225.
5 Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2006).
6 46 U.S.C. §§ 30302, 30308 (2006).
7 Bergin v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir. 1987).
8 In re Offshore Transport Servs., 409 F. Supp. 2d at 755-56.
9 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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waters.' 0 However, when DOHSA applies, courts may not supplement
its remedies with general maritime law remedies;" similarly, a Jones
Act seaman's remedies are limited to those available under the Jones
Act, even in an action brought under general maritime law. 12 In a case
where the decedent was neither a Jones Act seaman nor killed on the
high seas, damages may include loss of support, services, society and1
13
pain and suffering, and medical expenses.5 4
funeral expenses,
Finally, punitive damages are available under general maritime law.1
I. MARITIME LAW'S APPLICATION
The analysis necessary to determine whether state or admiralty
law governs a wrongful death claim parallels the analysis necessary to
determine whether a claim falls within the maritime jurisdiction of the
federal courts. 16 Admiralty jurisdiction will be invoked only where the
incident at issue satisfies17 conditions both of location and connection
with a maritime activity.
A court applying the location test must determine whether the
tort occurred on navigable waters or whether injury suffered on land
was caused by a vessel on navigable waters.' 8 In cases alleging
asbestos exposure, for example, claims are within admiralty jurisdiction
if the plaintiff has been exposed to asbestos on navigable waters
regardless of whether he has also suffered exposures on land. 19
Frequently, such situations arise when the alleged exposure occurred on
a naval vessel in navigable waters.2 °
Determining whether there is a sufficient connection
wrong committed and maritime activity involves applying
test. First, a court must look to the general features of
involved and determine whether the incident had the

between the
a two-prong
the incident
potential to

1o Id.
11 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
12 Miles v. Apex Marine, Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
13
14
15

Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
Torrejon v. Mobil Oil Co., 876 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 2004).
In re Horizon Cruises Litig., 101 F. Supp. 2d 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

16 Harville v. Johns-Manville Prods., 731 F.2d 775, 779 (1lth Cir.
1984); see also In re Chicago Flood Litig., 719 N.E.2d 117 at 1124.
'7

id.

18 Id.

Harville, 731 F.2d at 782.
See Lambert v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 877, 883
(S.D. Ind. 1999).
'9
20
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disrupt maritime commerce. Then the court must determine whether
the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a
substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. 2' Notably, even
a remote possibility of impact on maritime commerce is enough to
support admiralty jurisdiction. 22 "Although ... [admiralty] cases do not
say that every tort involving a vessel on navigable waters falls within
the scope of admiralty jurisdiction no matter what, they do show that
ordinarily that will be so."' 23 Moreover, courts have "consistently held

that ship repair is a maritime activity.

24

1I. THE JONES ACT
In 1920, the United States Congress passed the Jones Act, which
provides a seaman with the right to recover damages against his
employer for negligence resulting in his injury or death.25 As the Jones
Act applies only to seaman, not all individuals injured or killed aboard
vessels are entitled to recovery under the Act. However, the Jones Act
does not clearly define "seamen," and courts have, therefore, been
forced to interpret the scope of Jones Act coverage.
Seaman status is a mixed question of law, taking into account,
for example, the nature of the vessel to which the individual is
assigned. 26 An employee who, for example, eats all meals upon a
vessel and sleeps upon a vessel that remains secured to a shipyard's
dock for the entirety of his employment may be a seaman but the
employee is more likely an "at will" day laborer who
27 happens to work
aboard the vessel but who never sails with the vessel.
Prior to 1991, the United States Supreme Court had not
affirmatively stated what constituted a seaman under the Jones Act.
Rather, the Fifth Circuit standard had been adopted by most courts
21
22

In re Chicago Flood Litig., 729 N.E. 2d 1127.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. City of Chicago, 3 F.3d 225, 228

(7th Cir. 1993).
23 Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.
527, 543 (1995).
24 Garlock Sealing Technologies v. Little, 620 S.E.2d 773, 776 (Va.
2005) (holding submarine builder/repair worker's asbestos claim was governed
by maritime law).
25 Act of June 5. 1920, ch. 250; 41 Stat. 988 (codified as amended at 46

U.S.C. app. § 688 (recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006)).
26
27

McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 341-57 (1991).
See Lara v. Arctic King, Ltd., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1179-81 (W.D.

Wash. 2001).
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reviewing the issue. Under the Fifth Circuit test, an injured worker is a
seaman for purposes of Jones Act protection if he has been more or less
permanently assigned to a vessel in navigation and has a job that
contributed to the function or mission of the vessel.2 8When the Jones
Act was enacted, prior jurisprudence suggested that qualification as a
seaman extended to those individuals who furthered the purposes of the
voyage. 29 The enactment of the Longshore and Harbors Workers'
Compensation Act ("LHWCA") changed this concept.
III. THE LHWCA
The LHWCA excludes "a master or members of a crew of any
vessel" from its coverage. 30 Courts have accordingly held that the
LHWCA and the Jones Act are mutually exclusive. 3' Because the two
Acts operate independently, those provided coverage under the
LHWCA are necessarily excluded from recovery under the Jones Act.
As the Supreme Court stated in McDermott International, Inc. v.

Wilander, "[M]aster or member of a crew is a refinement of the term
'seaman' in the Jones Act; it excludes from LHWCA coverage those
32
properly covered under the Jones Act."
Although the division between coverage under the Jones Act and
the LHWCA seems straightforward, the Jones Act seaman requirement
still remained a point of contention for courts. In South Chicago Coal
& Dock Co. v. Bassett, the United States Supreme Court sought to

28

See Offshore Co. v. Robinson. 266 F.2d 769, 776-81 (5th Cir. 1959);

see also Johnson v. John F. Beasley Constr. Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1060 (7th Cir.

1984) (holding that because plaintiffs duties were unrelated to the transport
function of the vessel, plaintiff was not a seaman under the Jones Act).
29 See Int'l Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50, 52 (1926) ("Words

are flexible.... We cannot believe that Congress willingly would have allowed
the protection to men engaged upon the same maritime duties to vary with the
accident of their being employed by a stevedore rather than by the ship.").
30 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G)(2006).
31 See Irving J. Warshauer & Stevan C. Dittman, The Uniqueness of
Maritime Personal Injury and Death Law, 79 TuL. L. REv. 1163, 1175 (2005);
see also Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1946) (holding that the
Jones Act and LHWCA are mutually exclusive); McDermott, Inc. v.
Bourdreaux, 679 F.2d 452, 455-59 (5th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that the test for
seaman status under the LHWCA and the Jones Act are mutually exclusive);
Bodden v. Coordinated Caribbean Transp., Inc., 369 F.2d 273, 274 (5th Cir.
1966) (finding that the LHWCA and the Jones Act are mutually exclusive for
purposes of defining "seaman").
32 McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 347 (1991).
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classify the type of worker that the LHWCA was meant to cover. 3 The
Court stated that the purpose of the LHWCA was to provide coverage
for "persons serving on vessels, to be sure, but their service was that of
laborers, of the sort performed by longshoremen and harbor workers
and thus distinguished from those employees on the vessel who are
naturally and primarily on board to aid in her navigation. 34 In so
holding, the Court has provided a portal for some courts to adopt the
"aid in navigation" requirement when assessing status as a seaman
under the Jones Act.
In 1946, the Court again addressed the interplay between the
Jones Act and the LHWCA, stating:
We must take it that the effect of these provisions of
the Longshoremen's Act is to confine the benefits of
the Jones Act to the members of the crew of a vessel
plying in navigable waters and to substitute for the
right of recovery . . . only such rights to
compensation as are given by the Longshoremen's
Act. 3
In Wilander, the Supreme Court again sought to clarify the
definition of a seaman.36 There, the Court held that:
we believe the requirement that an employee's duties
must 'contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to
the accomplishment of its mission captures well an
important requirement of seaman status. It is not
necessary that a seaman aid in navigation or
contribute to the transportation of the vessel, but a
seaman must be doing the ship's work.37
The Court declined to define the "employment related connection to the
vessel in navigation" requirement, however.
In Chandris,Inc. v. Latsis, the Supreme Court stated that in order
to meet the requirement that a seaman have a connection to a vessel in
navigation or an identifiable group of vessels, that connection must be
"substantial in both duration and nature. 38 Concerning the temporal
element as stated in Chandris, the Supreme Court stated that the
" 309 U.S. 251, 253 (1940).
14 Id. at 260.
35 Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. I, 7 (1946).
36 498 U.S. 337, 353-57 (1991).
338 Chandris,
d. at 355. Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 370 (1995).
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substantiality of duration will be "determined by reference to
39 the period
covered by the Jones Act plaintiffs maritime employment.,
The second element from Chandris, that the connection to the
vessel in navigation be substantial in its nature, focuses upon the
employee's duties. 40 The Court stated, "[W]hen a maritime worker's
41
basic assignment changes, his seaman's status may change as well.
Thus, an injured victim's status as a seaman is not constant. Two years
42
after Chandris, the Court decided Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai.
In Papai,an injured worker hired to paint the housing structure of a tug
brought a claim for injuries under the Jones Act.43 During the course of
this employment, he fell from a ladder, sustaining injuries. His
employer, Harbor Tug and Barge Co., was the operator of the tug.
Papai reported to the port captain at his dockside office; his
employment was for only one day and he was not employed to sail with
the vessel after he completed his duties."4 However, Papai had been
hired by the same employer a dozen times in the preceding months
prior to his injury.45
In Papai,the Court addressed the "substantial connection" prong
of seaman status.46 For Papai's work out of a union hall to work on
tugboats owned by three unrelated employers, the Court determined
that his assignment was "transitory or sporadic. 47 The Court also
suggested that seaman status should be afforded only to those workers
who face regular exposure to the perils of the sea.48 Thus, in Papai,
although the worker spent more than 70% of his time on vessels that
actually went to sea on short voyages, he was engaged only on a dayto-day basis and hired to complete non-seagoing maintenance on those
vessels. The Court accordingly
held that he lacked a substantial
49
connection to the vessels.
Viewing the Supreme Court's decisions as a whole, it is not
necessary for a maritime worker to be engaged in a vessel's
navigational function to possess status as a seaman for purposes of
asserting a claim pursuant to the Jones Act. The worker must be more
'9 Id. at 371.
40

Id. at 371-72.

41

Id.

42

Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 560 (1997).

41 Id. at

44id.
45 Id.
46
47

Id.
Id.

48 id.
49 id.

551-52.
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or less permanently assigned to a vessel or perform a substantial part of
his work on the vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels under common
ownership or control. The vessel must be in navigation and the worker's
duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to its mission.
IV. DAMAGES RECOVERABLE UNDER MARITIME
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL STATUTES
When a non-seafarer is killed in state territorial waters, the
state's wrongful death and survival statutes are triggered and provide
the measure of damages compensable. 50 Additionally, all seafarers
who die within state territorial waters, except for vessel crewmembers,
are entitled to loss of society damages. 5' With the exception of the
recovery of damages for pre-death pain and suffering under the Jones
Act, discussed below, or the general maritime law, recovery is limited
to pecuniary loss under either DOHSA or the Jones Act. In Michigan
Central Railroad Co. v. Vreeland, the Supreme Court characterized
pecuniary loss as one which can be measured by some standard.52
Pecuniary loss can include loss of support, loss of services of the
deceased, loss of nurture, guidance, care and instruction, loss of funeral
expenses, and loss of inheritance.
V. RECOVERING FOR LOSS OF SUPPORT
The Death on the High Seas Act provides recovery for the value
of the financial contributions that a decedent would have made to his or
her dependents had he or she survived the injury. 53 Recovery for loss
of support necessitates a showing of dependence or expectation of
support. 54 In some cases, loss of support has extended to coverage of a
child's college education. 55 Any award of damages for pecuniary loss
into the future must be reduced to present value through the use of a
discount rate. 56 Courts must also reduce lost support awards by the
amount of money that the decedent would have consumed personally.
50 Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
51 Sea-Land Servs, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974); see also Joseph
E. Edwards, Measure and Elements of Damages in Action for Wrongful Death
Under General Maritime Law, 18 A.L.R. FED. 184 (2007).
52 Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland 227 U.S. 59 (1939).
53 Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 573.
54 Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1987).
55 See In re Matter of Adventure Bound Sports Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1192
(S.D. Ga. 1994); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976).
56 In re Matter of Adventure Bound Sports, 858 F. Supp. 1192.
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VI. RECOVERING FOR LOSS OF SERVICES OF THE DECEASED
Loss of general household services, including housework,
maintenance, and other assistance around the home constitute
compensable pecuniary losses under DOHSA.57 To recover for this
pecuniary loss, a claimant must present testimony assigning a value to
the services performed by the decedent.58 Such damages require proof
that such services were expected and likely to be provided but for the
wrongful death. 59

VII. RECOVERING FOR LOSS OF NURTURE, GUIDANCE AND
INSTRUCTION
Children of the decedent may be able to recover for the loss of
nurture, loss of instruction, and loss of physical, intellectual, and moral
training that they would have received from the decedent but for the
deceased parent's death.
Under DOHSA, such losses are
compensable. 6 °
The Ninth Circuit has specifically recognized loss of nurture to
children as being a recoverable damage. 6 1 Relying on Solomon, the
Court stated: "[w]ithout serious dispute, children may suffer a
pecuniary deprivation, apart from the loss of support and financial
contribution, from the death of their parents in the loss of parental
guidance and training, commonly identified as the loss of nurture. ' ' 62
Although this item of damage cannot be computed with any degree of
mathematical certainty, the courts in applying the structured pecuniary
loss test of DOHSA have held that the loss to children of the nurture,
instruction, and physical, intellectual, and moral training that they
would have received from their parents, but for the parent's wrongful
death, may constitute a pecuniary loss and, as such may be a
recoverable element of damages under DOHSA.63
The test outlined by the Solomon court requires claimants to
present evidence that they would have received or did receive in the
57 Sea-Land, 414 U.S. 573; Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754
F.2d 1274, 1287 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
58 Ivy v. Sec. Barge Lines, 585 F.2d 732, 740 (5th Cir. 1978); Martinez

v. P.R. Marine Mgmt., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (S.D. Ala. 1990).
59Bergen, 816 F. 2d at 2031.
60 Solomon, 540 F.2d at 788.
61 Nygard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983).
62 Id.

63 Solomon, 540 F.2d at 787.

2009]

MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH: A PRIMER

past care, nurture, and guidance from their parent prior to his or her
death. In declining to award damages for care, nurture, and guidance to
children past the age of majority, the Solomon court explicitly noted
that damages of this type were important for minors in their formative
years. Whether the child lived with the decedent is also a factor that
courts consider when assessing these damages. 64
RECOVERING FOR A DECEDENT'S PRE-DEATH PAIN
AND SUFFERING

VIII.

In Great Northern Railway Co. v. Capital Trust Co., the United
States Supreme Court set forth a minimum threshold for the recovery of
pre-death pain and suffering damages.65 Specifically, for the estate of a
decedent to recover pre-death pain and suffering damages, the decedent
must have been conscious for some period of time after sustaining his
or her injuries but prior to death. 66 As the Supreme Court has held, it is
clear that injuries suffered contemporaneously with death or with very
short periods of time separating injury and death do not give rise to
separate pain and suffering damages. 67 Thus, some appreciable amount
of time must pass between injury and death for the decedent's estate to
be able to seek pre-death pain and suffering damages under general
maritime law.
Interpreting this requirement, the Ninth Circuit has held that prior
to recovery for a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, a decedent's
estate must demonstrate that the decedent was conscious for at least
some period of time after suffering the injuries which resulted in his or
her death.68 Where a decedent's death is attributable to drowning,
courts frequently require evidence of a struggle or other evidence of
consciousness before awarding damages for pain and suffering prior to
64 Barrett v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1291, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(The award for loss of parental nurture and guidance to a noncustodial child
must be limited, because she was in her mother's custody at the time of her
father's death); see also In re Matter of Adventure Bound Sports, Inc., 858 F.
Supp. 1192, 1204 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (awarding $7,500 per year until age 18 for
lost nurture and guidance, reduced to present value).
65 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Capital Trust Co., 242 U.S. 144 (1916).
66

id

Id. at 147.
F/V CAROLYN JEAN, Inc. v. Schmitt, 73 F.3d 884, 885 (9th Cir.
1995). See also Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that ten seconds of consciousness did not meet the appreciable
period of time threshold established by the United States Supreme Court for
pre-death pain and suffering damages to be recoverable).
67

68
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death.69 Moreover, the fact that an autopsy determines that the cause of
death was drowning is not conclusive of consciousness sufficient to
award pain and suffering damages.7 ° In other words, the Fifth Circuit
requires an appreciable measure of consciousness on the part of the
decedent such that the decedent is manifesting an intention to save his
own life prior to death for pain and suffering damages to be awarded.7'
Where pre-death consciousness can be proven, courts have
upheld substantial pre-death pain and suffering awards. For example,
in Public Administrator v. United States Lines, Inc., a New York
appellate court affirmed an award of over $1.9 million in pre-death pain
and suffering damages where there was evidence that the decedent
seaman was conscious when he went overboard and that he could have
survived up to three hours in the water.72 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit
has upheld DOHSA pre-death pain and suffering awards in excess of
$1 million where there was a maximum of twelve minutes of
consciousness for the decedent after sustaining injury but prior to
death.73
IX. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY APPLIES
In addition to the types of damages which are generally available
under principles of maritime law, the question of each defendant's
share of liability is also important for an injured plaintiffs recovery.
"Liability in maritime actions under U.S. law is joint and several and,
as such, each individual74 tortfeasor is liable in full for damages
sustained by the plaintiff.

69

See James P. Jacobson, "Maritime Wrongful Death: Causes ofAction

and Damages," I Ann. 2007 AAJ-CLE 55 (2007) (citing Grantham v. Quinn
Menhaden Fisheries, Inc., 344 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1965)); Davis v. ParkhillGoodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1962); Gardner v. Nat'l Bulk
Carriers, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 243, 246 (E.D. Va. 1963) (ajfd 333 F.2d 676 (4th
Cir. 1964).
70 Davis, 302 F.2d at 495.
71 id.

72 Pub. Adm' v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 603 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993).

73Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co. Ltd., 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996).
74Man Ferrostaal, Inc. v. MV Vertigo, 447 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321

(S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,

443 U.S. 256 (1979); McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde and River Don Castings
Ltd., 511 U.S. 202 (1994) ("[o]ne can read that opinion [Edmonds] as merely
reaffirming the well established principle ofjoint and several liability.").
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X. PROPORTIONATE SHARE LIABILITY SHOULD BE LIMITED
TO SETTLING DEFENDANTS
In McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde and River Don Casting,75 the
United States Supreme Court adopted the "proportionate share"
approach to liability for matters governed by maritime law. Under this
approach, "the money paid [by a settling defendant] extinguishes any
claim that the injured party has against the released tortfeasor and also
diminishes the claim that the injured party has against the other
tortfeasors by the amount of the equitable share of the obligation of the
released tortfeasor. ' ,76 The Court further noted,
[tihere is no tension between joint and several
liability and a proportionate share approach to
settlements. Joint and several liability applies when
there has been a judgment against multiple
defendants. It can result in one defendant paying
more than its apportioned share of liability when the
plaintiff's recovery from other defendants is limited
by factors beyond the plaintiffs control, such as a
defendant's insolvency. When the limitations on a
plaintiff's recovery arise from outside forces, joint
and several liability makes the other defendants,
rather than an innocent plaintiff, responsible for the
shortfall.77
In practice this means that the jury must be asked to determine the
percentage of fault attributable to the parties and defendants who have
settled. The defendants who remain at the time of verdict shall have
the right to have their liability reduced by the percentage of fault
attributed to the plaintiff and settling-defendants.

75

McDermott, 511 U.S. 202.

76

Id. at 209.

77

Id. at 220-21.
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Xl. MARITIME LAW'S PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
State laws which conflict with maritime law are preempted.78
State law may supplement maritime law when maritime law is silent or
where a local matter is at issue, but state law may not be applied where
it would conflict with federal maritime law. 79 Even if a case is tried in
state court, a federal maritime rule of decision applicable to the
controversy would still displace a conflicting state rule.8 0 Federal
maritime law is a sweeping preemption of any state law which would
limit those remedies available under maritime law.8' In essence, state
law can expand8 2the remedies available, but the state cannot act to limit
those remedies.
Maritime tort actions are governed by the Uniform Statute of
Limitations for Maritime Torts, which provides a three year limitations
period from the date "the cause of action arose."8 3 A cause of action
accrues, for purposes of general maritime law, when a plaintiff knew or
should have known of his injury and its cause. 4 On the other hand, the
IPLA's statute of repose contains a ten-year limitations period, I.C. 331-1.5-5, but is not subject to such a discovery rule. As such, when a
state statute of repose is inconsistent with the federal maritime law, the
state statute is inapplicable. 5
XII. CONCLUSION
Federal maritime wrongful death law preempts any state's laws
in conflict, however, state law may supplement the Federal law where
the Federal law is silent. The choice of which federal body of law or
which federal statute is applicable in any given maritime injury or death
case is fact driven, and most frequently the outcome is determined by
78

In re Chicago Flood Litig., 308 Il.
App. 3d 330.

79 Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 627 (3d Cir. 1994).
80 Id. at n.5. This principle is sometimes referred to as the reverse-Erie

doctrine. Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 622, n.5.
81 Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996); see

also Horak v. Argosy Gaming Co., 648 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 2002).
82

Horak, 648 N.W. 2d 137.

83

46 U.S.C.A. § 30106 (2006).

84

White v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428

(I lth Cir. 1997).
85 See Lambert, 70 F. Supp. at 887; see also White v. Mercury Marine
Div. of Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428, 1431 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding a
Florida statute of limitations inconsistent with federal maritime statutes of
limitations).
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the injured party's employment status and the purpose for that
employment. The one universal fact is that, for as long as men sail to
sea in ships, there will be injuries and deaths.

